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TREATING PRIOR TERMINATIONS OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS AS GROUNDS FOR PRESENT TERMINATIONS
Kathleen Haggard
Abstract: The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 recognized that in certain
egregious circumstances, states need not seek to reunify a family before terminating the rights
of abusive and neglectful parents. Washington State responded by revising its termination of
parental rights statute to treat parents' violent criminal convictions as sole grounds for
terminating parental rights. This Comment argues that the Washington statute should be
further amended to recognize that a termination of rights to a previous child may serve as
grounds for terminating rights to a present child if the State finds the parent's continuing
behavior puts the child at risk for abuse or neglect. Washington courts have already
recognized that parents who have mistreated children are likely to continue to do so.
Furthermore, other state laws that treat prior terminations as sufficient proof of a parent's
present unfitness have been justified on public policy grounds and upheld under constitutional
scrutiny. This Comment concludes that the proposed statutory revision is constitutional
because the compelling State interest in protecting children outweighs the rights of abusive
and neglectful parents, and the Washington statute is already extremely protective of parents'
due process rights.
When a child has been abused or neglected and her parents lack the
capacity to care for her, terminating parental rights protects the child's
rights to nurture, safety, and welfare.' Termination facilitates the child's
integration into a stable and permanent home2 by ceasing all parental
involvement in the child's life and freeing her for adoption.3 As it affects
only present children, however, termination does not prevent parents
from mistreating children they have in the future. Our state lawmakers
should more closely examine a growing problem in child welfare
adjudication and society: parents who, having previously lost their
parental rights, bring new children into the world and promptly
demonstrate a tendency to mistreat them as they mistreated their previous
children.
1. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.020 (1998) (providing that child's health and safety is paramount
concern of child welfare proceedings).
2. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(6) (1998) (suggesting that desire for integration into stable
and permanent home is major factor in terminating parental rights).
3. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.200 (1998) (providing for termination of all rights, powers,
privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations of parenthood); Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.210 (1998)
(allowing for appointment of custodian to consent to child's adoption after termination of parental
rights).
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Consider a case in which Tina,4 a chronic drug abuser, has severely
neglected her two children, Jenny and Jason. When child protective
workers take the children into custody, they observe that Jenny and Jason
are filthy, infected with parasites, malnourished, and unresponsive to
human interaction. As a result of parental neglect, Jason has severe
diaper rash and cannot bear weight on his legs, while Jenny exhibits
behavioral problems and cognitive delays. The children are declared
dependent' and placed in licensed foster care while the Department of
Children and Family Services offers the mother drug treatment and
parenting classes. Tina fails to attend most of her treatment sessions and
continues to abuse drugs. Many months later, finding the State had made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her, the court terminates Tina's parental
rights. Child protective workers subsequently learn that Tina is pregnant,
and she soon gives birth to a baby girl. While her newborn is receiving
medical treatment for cocaine addiction, Tina visits the child only once.
The family court declares the baby dependent and the State places her in
licensed care. Tina is again offered substance abuse treatment and
parenting classes, but again she fails to attend the sessions. Tina
demonstrates no ability to provide a safe and stable home for her infant.
Reunifying families like Tina's jeopardizes the welfare and safety of
children. Nevertheless, federal law has long required state child welfare
systems to make "reasonable efforts" to reunify families before
terminating the rights of abusive and neglectful parents.6 Leaving abused
or neglected children in parental custody seeks to ensure that children
will not spend long periods of time in foster care or endure the disruption
of multiple placements.7 With the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 (ASFA),8 federal lawmakers clarified this "reasonable efforts"
requirement.' The drafters ordered that in particularly egregious cases,
4. Although the facts of this case example have been taken from real dependency cases, character
names and profiles are fictional.
5. "Dependent" essentially means children have been abused or neglected or are at risk and state
intervention is necessary to remedy parental deficiencies. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. The reasonable efforts requirement was designed to achieve these goals. See infra text
accompanying notes 38-42.
8. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1998)). "ASFA" is the author's own shorthand. To the author's knowledge,
lawmakers and practitioners have not adopted this acronym.
9. See § 101(a), I1I Stat. at 2116 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(15)(B), (D) (West
Supp. 1998)) (defining ambit of reasonable efforts requirement).
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such as when a parent has been convicted of a violent crime victimizing
a child, the State must not seek to reunify the family before terminating
the parent's rights and seek an adoptive home for the child.' Following
the federal lead, Washington revised its statute to treat certain criminal
convictions as sole grounds for terminating parental rights."
This Comment argues that Washington should further amend its
termination statute to provide that, like a criminal conviction, a prior
termination of parental rights should, in some circumstances, constitute
sole grounds for terminating rights to a present child. A prior
termination, followed by a parent's demonstration of continuing
unfitness, indicates that decisive termination of parental rights is the best
way to protect the child's welfare. Termination ultimately facilitates
adoption, which alleviates many of the hardships children endure when
their natural parents are unfit to care for them.
Part I of this Comment defines child abuse and neglect, describes the
"reasonable efforts" requirement, and explains how new legislation treats
criminal convictions, but not prior terminations, as sole grounds for
present terminations. Part II discusses Washington's current termination
of parental rights law, and describes how it attempts to expedite the
process when a parent has previously lost rights to a child. Part III
explains how the judicial recognition that parents' past treatment of
children is indicative of future parenting supports treating prior
terminations as sole grounds for present terminations. Part IV argues that
the proposed statutory change would survive constitutional due process
challenge because it is essential to the welfare of children and adequately
protects parental rights.
I. ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND THE "REASONABLE EFFORTS"
REQUIREMENT
A. The Washington Definition of Child Maltreatment
Washington defines child abuse and neglect as "injury, sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a
child... by any person under circumstances which indicate that the
10. For a description of ASFA's provisions, see infra Part I.B.
11. See S.H.B. 2556, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998) (codified in scattered sections of Wash.
Rev. Code § 13.34 (1998)); infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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child's.. . health, welfare, and safety is harmed."' 2 The Department of
Social and Health Services (DSHS) is responsible for providing a general
definition of child maltreatment and discerning whether particular
children have been abused or neglected. In the employ of DSHS, social
service workers guide state and local attorneys through individual child
welfare adjudications. 3 Child welfare agents recognize several different
forms of child maltreatment, including physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse and physical, medical, and educational neglect. 4 Washington
appellate courts have affirmed terminations of parental rights when
parents had neglected children's basic physical, emotional, educational,
and environmental needs;' 5 subjected children to sexual, 16 emotional, 7
and physical abuse; and failed to protect children from abuse at the
hands of others. 9
Child welfare workers and legislators hesitate to define child neglect
specifically because it takes so many forms. Examples of neglect include
allowing children to suffer from infections and parasites;2  failing to
12. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.020(12) (1998).
13. Washington's Division of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is a subdivision of DSHS
with jurisdiction over child abuse and neglect. DCFS has two subdivisions devoted to child welfare:
Child Protective Services (CPS) and Child Welfare Services (CWS). This Comment uses the terms
"child welfare worker' and "child protective agent" to refer to DSHS employees. In most counties,
the Washington State Attorney General's Office provides legal representation for DSHS; in a few
counties, prosecuting attorneys represent the Department.
14. See generally Kathleen Coulbom Faller & Marjorie Ziefert, Causes of Child Abuse and
Neglect, in Social Work with Abused and Neglected Children: A Manual of Interdisciplinary
Practice 32 (Kathleen Coulbom Faller ed., 1981) (discussing forms and effects of child
maltreatment).
15. See In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash. App. 222, 225, 896 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1995); In re
Dependency of C.B., 61 Wash. App. 280, 281-82, 810 P.2d 518, 519 (1991); In re Dependency of
C.T., 59 Wash. App. 490,493-94, 798 P.2d 1170, 1172 (1990).
16. See In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wash. 2d 129, 134-36, 904 P.2d 1132, 1135-36 (1995);
In re Welfare of S.E. & D.E., 63 Wash. App. 244,246, 820 P.2d 47,48 (1991).
17. See Krause v. Catholic Community Servs., 47 Wash. App. 734, 736, 737 P.2d 280, 281-82
(1987).
18. See In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562,565, 815 P.2d 277,279 (1991).
19. C.B., 61 Wash. App. at 281, 810 P.2d at 519.
20. See In re Dependency of J.C., 78 Wash. App. 143, 145, 896 P.2d 720, 721-22 (1995), rev'd,
130 Wash. 2d 418, 924 P.2d 21 (1996). As the facts of this case demonstrate, courts grant
termination only in egregious cases of neglect. J.C.'s parents' home was littered with rotten garbage
and animal feces. All the children suffered from ringworm and head lice, and one child had a
cockroach embedded in his ear canal. Id.
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provide for children's basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter;21
causing children to be underdeveloped and unable to interact with adults
by failing to provide physical and mental stimulation;22 and maintaining
children in filthy, unsafe environments.' Neglected children suffer a
variety of effects, including extreme inattentiveness, excessive
dependency, and poor school performance.24
Physical abuse is characterized by violent conduct or excessive
discipline." Physically abused children suffer not only physical injury,
but emotional and developmental effects as well. Abused children
display heightened anger, frustration, hyperactivity, lack of self-control,
low self-esteem, self-destructive behaviors, and poor school
performance.26 A significant percentage of abused children mistreat their
own families during adulthood.27 Adults abused as children may also
have a higher risk of committing violent criminal offenses and a greater
propensity toward anger, aggression, and suicide.2"
Sexual abuse is defined as any contact or interaction in which the
child is sexually exploited for the gratification or profit of the
perpetrator.29 Sexual abuse causes severe emotional problems in children,
including aggressive sexualized behavior, unusual fears, nightmares,
poor school performance, impaired concentration, low self-esteem,
suicidal tendencies, eating disorders, and social withdrawal."
Washington DSHS ranks a parent's prior serious abuse or neglect of
other children among the highest of risk factors predicting the parent's
21. See In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 565, 815 P.2d 277, 279 (1991); In re
Dependency of P.A.D., 58 Wash. App. 18, 22-23,792 P.2d 159, 161-62 (1990).
22. See In re Dependency of C.T.. 59 Wash. App. 490,493-94, 798 P.2d 1170, 1172 (1990).
23. See J.C., 130 Wash. 2d at 420-21, 924 P.2d at 23; In re Welfare of AJ.R., 78 Wash. App.
222,225, 896 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1995); C.B., 61 Wash. App. at 281, 810 P.2d at 519.
24. Byron Egeland, A Longitudinal Study of High-Risk Families: Issues and Findings, in The
Effects of Child Abuse and Neglect 33, 50-51 (Raymond H. Starr, Jr. & David A. Wolfe eds., 1991).
25. For a description of the forms of physical abuse and the injuries abused children commonly
suffer, see Kathleen Coulbom Faller et al., Types of Child Abuse and Neglect, in Faller & Ziefert,
supra note 14, at 13-3 1.
26. See Egeland, supra note 24, at 49-50.
27. See Raymond H. Starr, Jr. et al., Life-Span Developmental Outcomes of Child Maltreatment,
in Effects of ChildAbuse and Neglect, supra note 24, at 1, 5-7.
28. Id. at 11-12, 14-16.
29. Mary Gibbons & E. Chris Vincent, Childhood Sexual Abuse, 49 Am. Fain. Physician 125, 125
(1994). Sexual abuse may include fondling, exhibitionism, pornography, and penetration. Id.
30. Id. at 127.
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propensity to maltreat children in the future.3' Abusive and neglectful
parents, who "are not candidates for quick change,"32 may require long-
term treatment and support to improve their parenting skills.
Additionally, a parent's previous involvement with child protective
services may indicate that a child's siblings are in danger. Abuse or
neglect of one child creates a corresponding risk that the parent will
abuse or neglect the child's siblings.3
Psychologists find that abusive parents frequently possess certain
identifiable personality characteristics 34 that, if not corrected, may
contribute to re-offense. These traits include low self-esteem, excessive
dependency, impulsiveness, anger, aggression, deficient conscience,
parental collusion in abuse, cognitive delays, substance abuse, and a
tendency to scapegoat children for problems.3 A smaller number exhibit
psychopathy, which manifests itself in a lack of remorse for violent
actions, 36 and psychosis, the harboring of delusions in which the parent
may see the child as devil-possessed or potentially harmful.37
B. The "'Reasonable Efforts " Requirement
Juxtaposed against the horrors of abuse and neglect and the risk that
parents will continue to mistreat their children is the federal requirement
that state social service agencies make reasonable efforts to reunify and
prevent the fragmentation of families. The Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-272)38 required state child welfare
agencies to make reasonable efforts to maintain children in the home and
leave families intact. This Act sought to reunify families, combat foster
care "drift," encourage child welfare agencies to plan systematically for
31. See Washington State Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., Risk Factor Matrix (on file with author).
32. Victor I. Vieth. The Mutilation of a Child's Spirit: A Call for a New Approach to Termination
of Parental Rights in Cases of Child Abuse, 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 727, 731 (1994).
33. Karen S. Kassenbaum, The Siblings of Abused Children: Must They Suffer Harm Before
Removal from the Home?, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1547, 1551 (1996).
34. Faller & Ziefert, supra note 14, at 34.
35. Id. at 34-41.
36. Id. at 35-36.
37. Id. at 36-37.
38. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1994)).
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children's permanent placements, and revise financial programs that
previously had given states an incentive to place children in foster care.39
P.L. 96-272 conditioned the grant of federal funding to state foster
care upon state courts making a specific finding in each case that the
child welfare agency had directed reasonable efforts toward family
reunification.4" "Reasonable efforts" was purposefully left undefined in
order to allow state courts to make findings on a case-by-case basis.4"
The requirement is commonly satisfied when the State has offered
adequate services designed to remedy parental deficiencies.42 For
example, the Washington statute commands the State to offer parents
services' and the State must prove it has offered all reasonable services
before a court may terminate parental rights.'
Unfortunately, the 1980 reasonable efforts requirement wrought tragic
consequences. Often, states interpreted reasonable efforts, as outlined in
the statute, to mean "unreasonable" efforts--"efforts to reunite families
which are families in name only... [families with] dangerous, abusive
adults who represent a threat to the health and safety and even the lives
of these children."45 Members of the U.S. Congress in 1997 were
incredulous that their predecessors in 1980 could have intended States to
return children to the custody of adults who had proven themselves
dangerous and abusive."
In 1997, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA),47 which excuses states from directing reasonable efforts toward
reunification when parents have been convicted of certain crimes against
children. ASFA orders states to petition immediately to terminate the
39. Mark Hardin, National Legal Resource Ctr. for Child Advocacy & Protection, The Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, P.L. 96-272: An Introduction for Juvenile Court Judges
1-2 (1983).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Dennis Ichikawa, Outline of Reasonable Efforts (P.L. 96-272), at 2 (1993).
42. Hardin, supra note 39, at 10-11.
43. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(4)(b)(i) (1998) (ordering agency to provide plan detailing
services to be provided parent).
44. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(4) (1998).
45. 143 Cong. Rec. S12,669 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
46. See id.
47. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A. (Vest Supp. 1998)).
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rights of parents who have been convicted of murder, manslaughter, or
assault of a child, or conspiracy to perpetrate any of these crimes.4
In compliance with ASFA, the Washington Legislature enacted a
significant amendment to the state termination statute.49 The amendment
abolishes the requirement that the State prove the traditional elements of
a termination when the parent has committed murder or manslaughter
against a child, or has assaulted the surviving child or another child of
the parent." The criminal conviction becomes, in and of itself, grounds
for terminating parental rights." Most importantly, a prior conviction
exempts the State from proving that it has offered the parent all services
reasonably capable of remedying parental deficiencies, so that
termination may be granted immediately.52 But the amendment had no
effect on prior terminations. Therefore, the current scheme, which
affords no significant evidentiary weight to prior terminations of parental
rights, remains in place.
II. THE WASHINGTON TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS LAW
In Washington, termination of parental rights occurs in two phases:
dependency and termination.53 Children first enter the State's jurisdiction
by being declared "dependent," which means they have been abused,
neglected, abandoned, or are at risk, such that state intervention is
48. § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. at 2118 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West Supp.
1998)). Specifically, ASFA directs states to file immediately for termination when the parent has
been convicted of murder or manslaughter of another child, conspiracy to do so, or felony assault
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. at
2118. Additionally, ASFA suggests that reasonable efforts to return the child home shall not be
required when the State has terminated parental rights to a sibling, but does not treat prior
terminations as sole grounds to file immediately for termination. § 101(a), 111 Stat. at 2116 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (West Supp. 1998)).
49. S.H.B. 2556, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vash. 1998) (codified in scattered sections of Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.34 (1998)).
50. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(8)(a)-(d) (1998).
51. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(8) (1998). The traditional elements of termination are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 88-90, infra.
52. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(4) (1998) commands the State to prove that services have been
"expressly and understandably" offered or provided.
53. Not all, or even most, parents with dependent children ultimately lose their parental rights.
Other outcomes of dependency include in-home placement, guardianship, and dismissal. See Wash.
Rev. Code § 13.34.130(4)(a) (1998) (listing dismissal, in-home dependency, and guardianship as
possible outcomes of dependency).
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necessary to prevent harm and remedy parental deficiencies. 4 The
dependency phase is remedial; its purpose is to help preserve and mend
family ties through state intervention. Before terminating a parent's
rights, a child must have been declared dependent and have resided in
out-of-home placement for a minimum of six months,5 during which
time the State provided the parent services and the chance to remedy
parental deficiencies. Involuntary termination, which follows the
dependency period, achieves the "unmitigated cessation of all natural and
legal rights a parent has with a child .... It terminates the parent-child
relationship, including the parents' rights to the custody of the child[,]
the right to visit the child... [and] the necessity to consent to adoption
of the child....""56 While dependency seeks to maintain family ties,
termination-the remedy of an unsuccessful dependency-severs them.
A. The Dependency Phase
From the very beginning of a child's dependency, the State offers
parents a variety of services to achieve the goal of family reunification.
Biological parents have a right to custody and control of their children
that may not be abridged unless the state has made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family and has provided the parent the protection of due
process safeguards.57 The Washington dependency statute contains an
array of procedural protections giving parents the right to notice,
opportunity to be heard, representation by counsel, and attendance at all
hearings.
Dependency adjudication usually begins when an interested party,
such as a child welfare agent, having noticed evidence or heard a report
54. For a definition of dependency under the statute, see infra note 71 and accompanying text
55. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(1) (1998) (providing that at termination trial, State must prove
child has been declared dependent); Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(3) (1998) (providing that at
termination trial, State must prove child has been residing out-of-home for at least six months). An
exception to the six month rule is the aggravated circumstances provision, which allows a
termination trial to proceed immediately following the declaration of dependency. See infra Part
H.C.
56. Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children
Through Statutory Termination ofParental Rights, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 757, 765 (1996) (citation
omitted).
57. See In re Welfare of S.E. & D.E., 63 Wash. App. 244, 250, 820 P.2d 47, 50 (1991).
58. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of parents' constitutional
rights, see infra Part IV.
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of abuse or neglect, files a dependency petition with the court.5 9 The
court has cause to remove a child from the home if it reasonably believes
the child's health, safety, and welfare will be seriously endangered if he
or she is not removed." If the court finds cause, it enters an order
directing a law enforcement officer, probation counselor, or child
protective services official to take the child into custody. Child
protective agents must make reasonable efforts to inform parents of the
reasons for their child's removal and advise them of their legal rights.6'
The State routinely intervenes before children suffer harm pursuant to
a general goal of saving children from "unnecessary torture and possible
death."'63 Child protective agents may find that infants born to parents
who have mistreated other children face clear and present danger of
harm, even if the parents have not yet maltreated them.64 The State is
authorized to take these children into custody at birth.65
The parent is entitled to a shelter care hearing within seventy-two
hours of the child's removal, at which the court decides whether to order
that the child remain in out-of-home placement or return home.6 At the
shelter care hearing, parents have the right to representation by an
attorney, as well as the right to speak, introduce evidence, and examine
witnesses on their own behalf.67 Courts must appoint attorneys for
indigent parents unless they have expressly and voluntarily waived the
right to counsel.6 8 Following the shelter care hearing, the court must
59. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.040 (1998).
60. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.050(1)(c) (1998).
61. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.050(1) (1998).
62. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(2) (1998).
63. See Erika T. Blum, When Terminating Parental Rights Is Not Enough: A New Look at
Compulsory Sterilization, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 977, 998 (1994).
64. In re Dependency of Frederiksen. 25 Wash. App. 726, 610 P.2d 371 (1979). When CPS takes
an unharmed child out of parental custody because the parent has previously abused or neglected
other children, the parent still receives all the procedural safeguards of the dependency explained
infra.
65. Id.
66. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(1) (1998). The statute requires that all children whose parents
face termination must reside in out-of-home care for six months prior to the filing of the termination
petition, absent an aggravated circumstance. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(3) (1998). However, the
child's six months of out-of-home placement need not be continuous. In re Dependency of C.A., 55
Wash. App. 638, 779 P.2d 1155 (1989).
67. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(6) (1998).
68. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(5) (1998).
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return the child to the parent unless return would present a serious threat
of substantial harm to the child.69
If at the shelter care hearing the court decides the child should remain
out of parental custody, the court must conduct a dependency fact-
finding hearing within seventy-five days of the child's removal. 0 The
purpose of fact-finding is to determine whether the child should be
declared dependent. According to the statute, a dependent child is one
who has been abandoned; has been abused or neglected; or has no parent,
guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for her, such that the
child faces danger of substantial damage to her psychological or physical
development.7'
Immediately following the fact-finding, or within fourteen days,72 the
court must hold a dependency disposition hearing, during which it
declares where the dependent child is to be placed: with the parent, a
relative, or in licensed foster or group care.73 The court may order that
the child reside out of parental custody only if the State has made
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal and to
enable the child to return home.74 Additionally, the statute requires the
court to find clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of a manifest danger
that the child will suffer serious abuse or neglect if returned to parental
custody.7"
At the dependency disposition, the child welfare agent must provide
the court with a plan detailing the steps that will be taken to return the
child home, the services to be offered to the parents, and the actions to be
taken to maintain parent-child ties.76 Services offered include alcohol and
drug treatment,77 lessons in basic hygiene and child care,7 parenting
69. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(8)(b)(ii) (1998). Another ground to keep a child out-of-
home is that there is "no parent... to provide supervision and care for such child." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.34.060(8)(b)(i) (1998).
70. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.070 (1998) (providing that fact-finding hearing must occur within
this time period unless exceptional reasons for continuance are found).
71. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.030(4)(a)-(c) (1998).
72. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.110 (1998).
73. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(1) (1998).
74. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(1)(b).
75. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(1)(b)(iii).
76. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(4)(b) (1998).
77. See, e.g., In re Dependency of J.C., 78 Wash. App. 143, 146, 896 P.2d 720, 722 (1995), rev'd,
130 Wash. 2d 418, 924 P.2d 21 (1996).
78. See, e.g., In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash. App. 222, 229, 896 P.2d 1298, 1302 (1995).
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classes,7 9 supervised visitation," visiting public health nurse services,"
anger management training," and mental health counseling. 3 If a parent
fails to remedy deficiencies after being offered services and the child
welfare agent is convinced the parent is unlikely to become a capable
parent in the near future, the termination process may begin.
B. The Termination Phase
Washington courts have consistently advised that "[termination] of
parental rights should be allowed 'only for the mcst powerful
reasons."' 84 Accordingly, courts hear termination petitions only after
considerable efforts to cure parental deficiencies and reunify the family
have failed. After the filing of termination petitions,85 courts may
involuntarily terminate rights only upon finding that parents have
abused, neglected, or abandoned the children and are unable or unwilling
to change in the near future.86
Courts must conduct exhaustive termination trials to decide whether to
terminate parental rights.87 At trial, the State must produce clear and
convincing evidence88 that: (1) the child has been found dependent,
(2) the court has entered a dispositional order declaring the child
dependent and determining placement, (3) the child has been or will have
been removed from parental custody for at least six months, (4) the State
has offered the parent all necessary and reasonably available services
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Hall, 99 Wash. 2d 842, 844, 664 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1983).
81. See, e.g., In re Dependency of C.T., 59 Wash. App. 490,496,798 P.2d 1170, 1173 (1990).
82. See, e.g., J.C., 78 Wash. App. at 147, 896 P.2d at 722.
83. See, e.g., id.
84. See, e.g.. A.JR., 78 Wash. App. at 229, 896 P.2d at 1302 (citations omitted).
85. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180 (1998) (describing required elements of petition for
termination of parental rights).
86. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.030(4) (1998) (defining dependent child as one who has been
abused, neglected, or abandoned, or lacks parent capable of caring for her); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.34.180(1) (requiring child be found dependent prior to terminating parental rights); Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.34.180(5) (requiring termination court to find parent has little chance of remedying
deficiencies so child may be returned home); Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.190(2) (1998) (requiring
court to find that termination is in child's best interests).
87. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.190(I)(a) (1998) (providing that court may terminate parental
rights only if it finds that allegations of termination petition have been established at trial).
88. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.190(1)(a) (establishing clear, cogent, and convincing requirement);
see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (ordering states to prove elements of
termination by clear and convincing evidence).
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capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future,
(5) there is little likelihood conditions will be remedied so the child can
be returned to the parent in the near future,89 and (6) continuation of the
parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for
early integration into a stable and permanent home.9"
C. The Aggravated Circumstance
The Washington statute enumerates several "aggravated circum-
stances"9' that may indicate a child faces a heightened risk of harm and
that termination of parental rights should therefore be expedited. The
presence of an aggravated circumstance allows the court to bypass the
mandatory six-month waiting period between the child's removal from
the home and the filing of the termination petition.92 With an aggravated
circumstance the court may, once the child is declared dependent, order
the child welfare agency to petition for termination of parental rights.93
89. In determining whether conditions will be remedied, the statute authorizes the court to
consider use of intoxicating or controlled substances that renders the parent incapable of providing
proper care for the child, psychological incapacity, or mental deficiency, combined with the parent's
unwillingness to receive treatment for either drug abuse or psychological problems. Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.34.180(5). Documented multiple failed treatment attempts may allow the court to
conclude the parent is unwilling to receive treatment. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(5).
90. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(1)-(6). In lieu of the six requirements, the court may grant
termination if the State proves that the parent's whereabouts are unknown, or, under the 1998
statutory revisions, the child has been declared dependent and the parent has been convicted of
murder or manslaughter of another child, or assault against the surviving child or another child of the
parent. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(7), (8). Additionally, if the State establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt the child's dependency and disposition, little likelihood that conditions will be
remedied so that a child can be returned home, and that continuation of the parent-child relationship
hinders the child's integration into a stable and permanent home, the State need not establish that the
child has been removed for six months and all reasonable services have been offered or provided.
See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.190(1)(b) (1998).
91. The statute lists the following aggravated circumstances: the parent's conviction of rape,
criminal mistreatment, or assault of the child; the parent's conviction of murder, manslaughter, or
homicide by abuse of the child's other parent, sibling, or another child; a prior termination of
parental rights granted in response to a parent's failure to complete services; a finding by the court
that the parent is a sexually violent predator, abandonment of an infant under three years of age; or
the birth of three or more drug-addicted infants. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(c)(i)-(ix) (1998).
Some of these aggravated circumstances are now sole grounds for termination of parental rights
under the 1998 amendments. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(8). The statute does not treat prior
termination of parental rights as grounds for present termination.
92. The six month waiting period is contained in Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180(3).
93. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2) (1998).
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The statute recognizes that a parent's previous termination of parental
rights presents an aggravated circumstance.94 When a parent has
previously lost rights to a child, the court is authorized to order expedited
filing of a termination petition for present children. The court will order
expedited filing pursuant to an aggravated circumstance only if it finds
that the parent has failed to effect significant, positive change in his or
her parenting abilities." Even with a finding that the parent has not
changed, the court may only take the aggravated circumstances shortcut
if the supervising agency recommends the parent's rights be terminated;
termination is in the best interests of the child; and because of the
aggravated circumstance, reasonable efforts to reunify the family are not
required.96
In enacting the aggravated circumstance provisions, the Legislature
acknowledged that a prior termination may necessitate moving swiftly
toward a present termination; but, even in egregious cases the aggravated
circumstance merely attempts to speed up filing of the termination
petition. An aggravated circumstance does not authorize courts to
expedite termination proceedings and trial, which are conducted after
filing. At an exhaustive termination trial, the State still must establish, by
clear and convincing evidence, the traditional elements of termination
before it can free the child from a parent who has previously mistreated
children and has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to change.97
III. WASHINGTON SHOULD TREAT PRIOR TERMINATIONS AS
GROUNDS FOR PRESENT TERMINATIONS
Treating criminal convictions as sole grounds for terminations is a
step in the right direction. However, Washington's newly amended
statute still fails to extend special protection to children whose parents
have previously lost parental rights but have not sustained criminal
94. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(c)(vii) (providing that previous failure to complete offered
services that resulted in termination of parental rights constitutes aggravated circumstance).
95. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(c)(vii). The phrase "failed to effect significant change" is not
specifically defined in the statute or in case law. Whether a parent has effected change must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Logically, child welfare agents measure failure to change in part
by a parent's non-compliance or non-completion of offered services designed to remedy parental
deficiencies.
96. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(a)-(c).
97. The elements the State must prove, even with an aggravated circumstance, are discussed in
Part II.B supra.
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convictions. Arguably, prior terminations may provide even stronger
evidence of parental unfitness; in every termination the State must prove
identical statutory elements.9"
The Washington Legislature should amend its statute to treat prior
terminations of parental rights both as aggravated circumstances-as it
currently does-and as grounds for bypassing the traditional elements of
termination and expediting the termination trial.99 The statute should
provide that if a court has found it necessary to declare a child dependent
and file an expedited termination petition pursuant to an aggravated
circumstance, the court should then treat the parent's prior termination as
sufficient evidentiary grounds to grant the present termination.'°0
The legislature should excuse the State from expressly proving that
the present child has been removed from the home for six months,' and
that the State has offered the parent services during the present child's
dependency. The court's declaration of dependency, along with the
aggravated circumstance, should prove that there is little likelihood
conditions will be remedied so the child can be returned to the parent,
and that continuation of the parent-child relationship frustrates the
child's integration into a stable and permanent home. The prior
termination, along with the necessity of declaring the present child
dependent, should create an inference that the parent is still unfit.
With a prior termination on the record, the statute should not require
the court to conduct an extensive termination trial at which the State
98. Criminal convictions call for a higher burden of proof than do terminations of parental rights.
Criminal culpability must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, while the State must establish the
elements of termination by clear and convincing evidence. See supra note 88. This distinction does
not unduly abridge parents' due process rights because terminations always invoke the same
standard: clear and convincing evidence. Treating a prior termination as sole grounds therefore does
not ask a court to rely on evidence proved at a lower quantum to establish a fact at a higher quantum.
99. For a description of the traditional elements of termination, see supra text accompanying
notes 89-90.
100. The importance of enacting legislation, rather than relying on courts to act in individual
cases, was recently demonstrated. A District of Columbia superior court judge ordered that Latrena
Pixley be moved from a detention center-where she is currently serving time for murdering her
infant daughter-to a facility that would allow her to retain custody of her two-year-old son. Sally B.
Donnelly, Mothers and Killers: A Child-Murderer Wins Custody of Her Son, Time, July 20, 1998, at
28, 28. A different judge had determined it was "in the child's best interests" to reside with his
biological mother, despite the fact that the boy's foster family wished to adopt him. Id. Foster-care
had been arranged informally and the mother was thus exempt from ASFA's mandatory termination
law. Id.
101. The aggravated circumstance provision abolishes this requirement with respect to prior
terminations. See supra Part II.C.
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must prove the same statutory criteria it established at the first
termination. Instead, the court should conduct a swift hearing, within
thirty days of the dependency disposition, during which the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the current child has
been declared dependent, °2 (2) the parent has undergone a previous
termination of parental rights, (3) termination of parental rights is in the
present child's best interests, and (4) the prior termination indicates that
services are unlikely to effectuate the present child's safe return to
parental custody.'13
Washington courts have often considered a parent's past conduct
when determining whether to declare a child dependent or terminate
parental rights.1°4 Additionally, a few other states have already
authorized, by court decision or statute, the expedited grant of present
terminations when a parent has lost rights to a previous child.0 5 The
proposed amendment would adequately protect parents' due process
rights because it retains the requirement that the State first find the
present child dependent and afford parents the safeguards of the
dependency process106--a process that adequately protect parents'
fundamental right to custody and control of children.0 7
A. Washington Courts Have Recognized that Past Parenting Predicts
Future Parenting
Washington courts have long held that parents' past treatment of
children, even when not verified in criminal convictions, may supply
proof of their future inability to parent. 0 8 Court decisions have also
suggested that parents' deficiencies, as demonstrated by past conduct
toward children, may predict a general inability to care for children.
As early as 1952, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
"brutal" and "sadistic" father who was incapable of raising children did
102. Even with a prior termination, the elements of a dependency remain the same. As discussed
in Part I.A, supra, the court still must find that the child is abused or neglected, faces risk of harm,
or lacks a parent capable of earing for her.
103. These "proofs" are modeled on the aggravated circumstances provisions already present in
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(a)-(c) (1998).
104. See infra Part I.A.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. For discussion of dependency safeguards, see supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
107. See infra Part IV.
108. See infra Part I.A.
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not have the "privilege of inflicting brutal treatment upon each of his
children in succession before they [could] individually obtain the
protection of the state."' 9 The court found that, because the dependency
and need to remove all the children was based on the parent's
deficiencies and past conduct, the trial court was excused from making
individualized findings of abuse to each child."0 Abuse of any one of the
children, evidencing the parent's "sadistic" nature, could justify
terminating the parent's rights to all the children at once."'
Similarly, Washington courts have found that parental deficiencies,
evidenced by the manner in which parents have treated their children in
the past, are predictive of whether they will become adequate parents in
the foreseeable future. In this vein, one court of appeals affirmed that an
abusive mother's schizophrenia contributed to a likelihood that she
would be unable to parent in the near future and that no available
services had a reasonable hope of improving her parenting capabilities." 2
Similarly, the court found that a father's "consistent refusal to
acknowledge responsibility for his actions show[ed] a lack of insight into
the consequences of his violent conduct" and that he had a tendency to
respond violently to certain situations." 3 The presence of an aggravated
circumstance (the murder of the children's mother) warranted expedited
termination of his parental rights because the court could readily
conclude that he was likely to react to future situations in the same
manner.' In so holding, the court impliedly recognized that the father's
parental deficiencies would not be remedied in the near future.
On a procedural level, Washington courts have long treated prior
terminations of parental rights as relevant to adjudication of present
dependencies. In proceedings to terminate parental rights to another
child, courts consider prior terminations.' The "entire record of
parenthood" is open for the court's investigation and inquiry because the
court is entitled to hear the entire story before acting." 6
109. In re Miller, 40 Wash. 2d 319, 321,242 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (1952).
110. Id. at 323, 242 P.2d at 1017-1S.
111. Id.
112. In re Dependency of C.T., 59 Wash. App. 490, 497-500, 798 P.2d 1170, 1174-75 (1990).
113. In re Dependency of C.B., A.B. & B.B., 79 Wash. App. 686, 692-93, 904 P.2d 1171, 1175
(1995).
114. Id. at 694, 904 P.2d at 1176.
115. In re Dependency of P.A.D., 58 Wash. App. 18, 27-28, 792 P.2d 159, 164-65 (1990).
116. Id. at 28, 792 P.2d at 164; see also In re Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 657, 277 P.2d 335, 335
(1954).
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As Washington courts have recognized, in all termination proceedings
the ultimate issue for resolution is whether a child's parents will be able
to meet that child's needs in the near future." 7 "Termination statutes by
their very nature, are prospective and predictive .... Their purpose is not
to punish parents for past behavior, but rather to prevent future harm to
children by interpreting past behavior as indicative of future parental
unfitness.""' A prior termination may give the court every reason to
terminate that parent's rights again; a court has already determined the
parent is unfit to care for a child's needs in the near future.
Washington courts understand that parents, not children, are the
source of child abuse and consequently, siblings of maltreated children
may face an equal risk of abuse or neglect. In giving prior
demonstrations of unfitness substantial weight, Washington courts have
laid the groundwork for the legislature to accomplish what other states
have already done by statute or court decision: treating prior terminations
of parental rights as sole grounds for present terminations.
B. Other States Have Found Treating Prior Terminations as Proof of
Parental Unfitness Necessary and Constitutional
Washington is not alone in recognizing that past parenting is a good
indicator of future parenting ability. Indeed, some jurisdictions have
extended even greater protection to children facing risk of aggravated
abuse. By terminating parental rights to one child on the basis of the
parent's previous mistreatment of other children, courts in other
jurisdictions have suggested that some parents may be unfit to care for
the children they have in the foreseeable future." 9 Similarly, other
jurisdictions have enacted statutes that give special evidentiary weight to
prior terminations of parental rights.2 These statutory provisions and
judicial grants of termination have been justified on public policy
grounds and upheld under constitutional scrutiny.
117. See P.A.D., 58 Wash. App. at 28, 792 P.2d at 165.
118. Haddix, supra note 56, at 786. The "predictive" nature of terminations is especially evident
in the Washington statute, which commands courts to find that all services capable of remedying
parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been offered, and there is little likelihood
that conditions will be remedied so the child can be returned home in the near future. Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.34.180(4)-(5) (1998).
119. Blum, supra note 63, at 998.
120. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
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In a landmark decision, Padgett v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services,' the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a
previous termination of rights could constitute sole grounds for
permanently severing the parent's rights to a new child.' The court
rejected the mother's argument that basing a termination on "prospective
abuse" is equivalent to jailing someone based on speculation that she
"would have" committed a crime," justifying the termination on public
policy grounds. The court held that exposing present children to abuse
when the state had established that the parents had previously mistreated
children posed an unacceptable risk to the child,'24 when the parent's
propensity to abuse was beyond reasonable hope of modification. 2
Finding that the legislature could not have intended to make children
suffer before trial courts could act,'26 the court declared, "While we are
loathe to sanction government interference in the sacrosanct parent-child
relationship, we are more reluctant still to forsake the welfare of our
youth. Florida's children are simply too important."'127
Similarly, a Missouri court of appeals' acknowledged that when a
child's older sibling had suffered abuse and the parent had not modified
deficiencies giving rise to the abuse, it would be a "tragic misapplication
of the law" to require the child "to suffer the fate of his siblings prior to
121. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
122. The Padgetts' rights to five children had been terminated after horrific abuse. The mother
bound her children by their wrists and left them unattended for hours. Id. at 566-68. Two of the
children exhibited signs of sexual abuse. Id. Additionally, the mother had pled guilty to sexually
abusing a four year old girl in her care. Ia Following the first termination (of all five children), the
Padgetts gave birth to a baby boy who was immediately removed from parental custody. Id. A
psychological evaluation revealed the Padgetts' propensity to abuse the new child was very great and
predicted that the parents were incapable of remedying their parental deficiencies. Id. After Mrs.
Padgett was found "poking" and displaying other inappropriate, sexual behavior toward her
newborn, the court granted the service agency's petition for a second termination. Id.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id. at 570.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 569.
127. Id. at 571.
128. In re Dependency of C.M.W., 813 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo. App. 1991). The mother had failed
to protect her son from severe and repeated sexual abuse at the hands of her uncle, and had neglected
to complete offered services. Id. She therefore lost rights to her son. Id. The mother's rights to her
new infant daughter were later terminated when it was discovered she was leading a dangerous
lifestyle, supporting herself by prostitution. Id. Additionally, she demonstrated parental apathy by
only sporadically attending supervised visits with her daughter. Id.
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termination."'2 9 The Missouri court interpreted its statute broadly,
justifying its holding on public policy grounds. The court found
authorization to terminate the parent's rights in the statute, which
allowed termination when a severe act or recurrent acts of abuse are
directed toward "any child in the family" and when the parent knew, or
should have known, that such acts were being committed. 3°
Other states, including Kansas and Maine, have enacted legislation
allowing courts to give great weight to a parent's previous adjudication
of unfitness. These states provide that a prior termination of parental
rights creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent is unfit to care for
the present child.'3 ' The Kansas law, enacted in 1994, has been twice
challenged on constitutional grounds and upheld. The courts have found
that inferring a parent's present unfitness from a past finding of unfitness
is not unreasonable or arbitrary.'32 Decisions have concluded that the
statute is facially constitutional provided that in each case the rebuttable
presumption arises from evidence having probative value concerning the
present adjudication,'33 the circumstances of the prior termination have a
rational connection to present circumstances,' the parent is given a
reasonable opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness, 35 and the
lapse of time between the prior adjudication of unfitness and the present
dependency is not too great.'36 The same court later held that a long
passage of time between the prior adjudication of unfitness and the
present dependency does not weaken the evidence of unfitness when the
parent has maintained continual contact with child protective service
workers, who have observed no improvement in parenting skills.'37
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447(2)(c) (1986)).
131. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1585(a)(1) (West 1992) (providing that parent is unfit if State
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has previously been found unfit); see
also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4055(1-A) (West 1995) (allowing courts to presume parents are
unwilling or unable to protect child from jeopardy, and that circumstances are unlikely to change in
time to meet child's needs, when court has previously terminated parental rights to another child).
132. In re Interest ofL.D.B., 891 P.2d 468, 471 (Kan. App. 1995).
133. In re Dependency of J.L., 891 P.2d 1125, 1133-34 (Kan. App. 1995) (explaining how
rebuttable presumption operates when presumption of unfitness arises from "probative" and "non-
probative" evidence).
134. Id. at 1136.
135. L.D.B., 891 P.2d at471.
136. .L., 891 P.2d at 1136.
137. In re Interest of L.D.B., C.C.B. & V.JB., 924 P.2d 642, 645-46 (Kan. App. 1996).
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Washington should follow Kansas in enacting legislation that gives
substantive weight to prior terminations. However, enacting a rebuttable
presumption in Washington would not be the most effective solution
because it would not shorten the time period necessary to terminate
parental rights. Merely shifting the burden of proof from the State (to
show parental unfitness) to the parent (to show parental fitness)'38 would
involve the same adjudicatory delays inherent in a system in which
identical elements of unfitness must be proved despite a prior finding of
unfitness. Even if the fitness burden were shifted to the parents, the State
would still have to conduct an exhaustive termination trial to determine
whether parents had successfully rebutted the presumption. Parents
would logically attempt rebuttal by establishing that they had completed
or attempted to complete remedial services." 9 This would effectively
force the State again to offer aid to parents who have demonstrated no
willingness or ability to complete court-ordered services, causing
unacceptable delays in the termination process.
Treating a prior termination as sole grounds for termination, rather
than as a mere rebuttable presumption of unfitness, would exempt the
State from again offering services to parents who have shown no
initiative to complete them and expedites the termination trial, thus
saving children considerable time. Furthermore, expediting the
termination trial would be constitutionally permissible because the
Washington statute, unlike many of its kind, affords parents sufficient
due process safeguards before termination is even contemplated. 40
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Individuals who have lost their parental rights have challenged the
Washington dependency and termination laws on constitutional due
process grounds.' 4' Parents have argued that their due process rights were
violated by: admitting at the termination trial a child's testimony
obtained outside the presence of parents;'4 requiring (as an element of a
termination) a finding of the child's dependency, which must be proved
138. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1585(b) (West 1998) (placing on parents burden of rebutting
presumption of unfitness).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
140. For discussion of parents' due process rights, see supra Part lIl.A. and infra Part IV.
141. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.E. & D.E., 63 Wash. App. 244, 249, 820 P.2d 47, 49 (1991);
Krause v. Catholic Community Servs., 47 Wash. App. 734, 738, 737 P.2d 280, 282 (1987).
142. See S.E. & D.E., 63 Wash. App. at 248, 820 P.2d at 49.
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by a mere preponderance of the evidence; 14 3 expediting termination
pursuant to an aggravated circumstance;'" and terminating parental
rights by default judgment.'45 Given the frequency in which parents raise
due process challenges to the existing statute, the recommended statutory
revision will probably face such a challenge.
In Santosky v. Kramer,'46 the U.S. Supreme Court explained that to
determine whether a state statute affords parents sufficient due process,
courts must balance three factors: the private interests affected by the
proceedings, the risk of error created by the state's chosen procedure,
and the countervailing government interest supporting use of the
challenged procedure. 47 With the proposed amendment, the private
interests affected are natural parents' desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of their children. 4 The
countervailing state interests are the need to protect children from abuse
and neglect and to expedite termination and adoption proceedings. The
State risks erroneously depriving parents of their interests if it fails to
afford them adequate due process safeguards or make sufficient findings
of unfitness before terminating their rights. 49
Treating prior terminations of parental rights as grounds for present
terminations satisfies due process. While parents have a constitutional
right to custody and control of their children, the state's interest in
protecting abused and neglected children by expediting child welfare
proceedings substantially outweighs this right. 50 Furthermore, the risk
that parents would ever be erroneously deprived of their rights is
minimal, given the many safeguards of the dependency process."
143. See Krause, 47 Wash. App. at 739-40,737 P.2d at 281.
144. See In re Dependency of C.B., A.B., & B.B., 79 Wash. App. 686, 689-91, 904 P.2d 1171,
1174-75 (1995).
145. See In re Dependency of C.R.B., 62 Wash. App. 608, 614, 814 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1991).
146. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
147. Id. at 754.
148. Id. at 758 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
149. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 (holding that countervailing State interest in maintaining
preponderance of evidence standard for terminations is slight compared to risk of erroneous
termination present at that level of proof).
150. See infra Part IV.B.
151. For examples of specific due process protections, see supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
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A. The Parent's Interest
While parents have a staunchly-protected right to raise their children,
that right is not absolute, but qualified by the rights of the child. The U.S.
Supreme Court has long identified freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 2 Supreme Court decisions protect the right to
marry,'53 use contraception,'54 terminate a pregnancy, 155 and educate
one's child 56 without undo State interference. In the specific context of
child welfare, the Supreme Court has recognized as fundamental unwed
fathers' right to have a hearing on fitness before their children are
declared dependent,'57 indigent parents' right to representation by
counsel,'58 and all parents' right to have the State establish the elements
of termination by clear and convincing evidence."'
Washington laws set forth the State's right and obligation to protect
children when parental action or inaction endangers their welfare. 6
Parents are entitled to due process protections including representation
by counsel, notice, opportunity to be heard, and a strict burden of proof,
but the right to parent does not confer the right to abuse. Child abuse and
neglect, "by their very nature, should be viewed as outside the scope of
the fundamental liberty interest."'16
Additionally, parents' constitutional right to custody and control of
their children must be considered relative to children's statutory rights.
To achieve the compelling state interest of safeguarding child welfare,
lawmakers have ordered that children's right to health, welfare, and
safety supersede parents' rights. ASFA's drafters refused to continue the
current system of "always putting the needs and rights of the biological
152. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
153. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965).
155. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391 (1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
protects parents' right to teach foreign languages to children).
157. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
158. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (establishing balancing
test for determining when State must provide counsel for indigent parents).
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
160. See, e.g., In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562,567,815 P.2d 277,281 (1991).
161. Haddix, supra note 118, at 773 (citation omitted).
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parents first."'62 Consequently, they commanded that children's safety
and health be the paramount concern.'63 Similarly, the Washington
statute explicitly provides that when the rights of parent and child
conflict, the child's rights to basic nurturing and a safe, stable, and
permanent home should prevail."
B. The Countervailing State Interest
As long as parents' basic due process rights are protected, the state
interest in protecting abused and neglected children substantially
outweighs unfit parents' interests in maintaining parent-child ties. First,
states have a general interest in protecting children from risk of abuse.
Second, states have a compelling interest in promoting efficient
adoption, a measure that cannot take place until biological parents' rights
are terminated.
Although they lack the full rights of adulthood, children are citizens of
the state entitled to protection against harm.'65 Termination, which
completely severs the parent-child relationship, frees children from the
risk of harm at the hands of their biological parents. As long as parental
rights are maintained, children risk being returned to their abusive or
neglectful homes.
In addition to protecting citizens from being harmed in childhood, the
state has a compelling interest in terminating parental rights because
child abuse and neglect create so many long-term problems that persist
into adulthood.'66 Abused and neglected children often have extreme
difficulty developing into responsible, productive adults. 67 Through
162. 143 Cong. Rec. S12,526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
163. See id.
164. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.020 (1998).
165. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing general state interest in protecting
young lives).
166. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
167. Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus
Parents, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1209, 1247 (1994); see also Bruce Chapman, Adoption Option Too Often
Neglected in State Foster Care Mess, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 4, 1997, at All (lamenting that
children "neglected by both their parents and their government" form disproportionate number of
adults in welfare system, mental institutions, homeless shelters, and prisons).
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termination, the state seeks to prevent societal ills by freeing children for
adoption and thereby securing stable, permanent homes for them.' 68
Children face victimization both at the hands of their parents and at
the hands of the State. Traditional termination and adoption procedures
are inefficient and often result in long delays. The current Washington
termination scheme delays children's adjudications because the State
must take the time to monitor parents to see if they have completed
social services'69 or have otherwise remedied parental deficiencies. The
State must then conduct an exhaustive termination trial. 70 While the
above delays are necessary to ensure thorough adjudication of the first
termination, such delays are unacceptable during subsequent
terminations, when present deficiencies indicate that parents have not
changed. Allowing courts to base present terminations on prior
terminations seeks to protect children from procedural delays and
expedite their integration into permanent homes.'71
States have a compelling interest in expediting their termination
processes because if they do not, adoptions will lag. Delaying
termination and adoption can be tragic because, as they age, children
become less adoptable and thus less amenable to placement in stable and
permanent homes. 7 Accordingly, federal law has declared that states
must work toward promoting adoptions in order to protect children more
effectively. ASFA seeks to reduce the time children must wait to be
adopted by requiring states to seek adoptive placement while courts are
still adjudicating dependencies and terminations.173 Similarly, ASFA
seeks to reduce interstate adoption barriers by prohibiting discrimination
against potential adoptive families from out-of-state. 74 Under ASFA, for
168. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 Fam. L.Q.
121,137 (1995-96).
169. See supra text accompanying note 89.
170. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
171. For an explanation of how the recommended statutory revision will expedite the termination
process, see supra Part M.
172. See In re Hall, 99 Wash. 2d 842, 848, 664 P.2d 1245, 1249 (1983) (finding that younger
children are generally more eligible for adoption than older children); O'Brien, supra note 167, at
1246 (same).
173. 143 Cong. Rec. S12,668, S12,672 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
174. Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 202(a), 111 Stat. 2116, 2125 (1997) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 622 (West Supp. 1998)); see also 143 Cong. Rec. at S12,672 (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
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the first time, states must make "reasonable efforts" to place children for
adoption if returning them to the family is not safe.
175
Efficient termination and adoption are compelling goals. Once the
State has removed a child from a parent, failure to integrate her promptly
into a permanent home can be devastating. Child psychologists have
noted that the absence of stable, long-term parental figures causes
children considerable disruption and emotional scarring. 176 Adoption in
the early weeks of an infant's life gives adoptive parents the chance to
develop a "psychological parent-child relationship"--a chance that is
diminished if adoption occurs after the child has already formed and
broken attachments. 177 The "instability" of foster placements and the
"series of moves that many foster children experience [results in]
problems of developing trust in others and a sense of appropriate
autonomy."'' 7 In conclusion, if biological parents are incapable of caring
for their children, it serves the children's best interests to sever parent-
child ties and move the children as swiftly as possible into stable and
permanent homes.
C. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The many procedural safeguards afforded parents mitigate the risk
that a parent's rights would ever be erroneously terminated. Under the
suggested statutory revision, all parents would retain their rights to legal
representation, notice, and the opportunity to speak, produce evidence,
and present witnesses at all hearings. 7 9 A prior termination would not
remove the necessity of holding these preliminary hearings to adjudge
whether the child faces a risk of abuse. The proposed amendment would
forbid filing of termination petitions before children have been actually
declared dependent and their parents have been granted both shelter care
and dependency fact-finding hearings."'
The existing statute already prohibits courts from ordering expedited
filing-pursuant to an aggravated circumstance-unless they are
convinced that the parent demonstrates a tendency to abuse or neglect a
175. 143 Cong. Rec. at S12,673 (statement of Sen. Craig).
176. Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 40-41 (1979).
177. Id. at 22.
178. Vieth, supra note 32, at 732.
179. For discussion of dependency procedures and protections, see supra Part lI.A.
180. See supra Part II.A.
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present child, and that it is necessary to declare the present child
dependent.'' Before a prior termination may ever be treated as an
aggravated circumstance, the court must find that the supervising agency
recommends the parent's rights be terminated, termination is in the best
interests of the child, and the prior termination and continuing
demonstration of unfitness make it unreasonable for the social service
agency to provide the parent further services in an effort to reunify the
family.'82 Under the proposed amendment, the State would be required to
establish similar elements again at the termination hearing, to be
conducted within thirty days of the dependency disposition.'83
The Washington statute, unlike many of its kind, affords parents a
myriad of due process protections before termination is even
contemplated. It is children, not parents, who are most in need of
additional protections. Therefore, expediting the termination process,
when the State has established that present children face a grave risk of
suffering the same fate as their siblings, would be constitutionally
permissible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recently, public sentiment has drifted away from the belief that
abused and neglected children should usually be returned to their parents
and toward a realization that "social workers should put less emphasis on
trying to fix broken families and more emphasis on finding children a
safe home."'84 Although child welfare agencies must continue to seek
family reunification, these efforts should not "[discount] a child's interest
in being cared for by people who will love and not mistreat him or
her."'8 s In accordance with this new way of thinking, federal lawmakers
have directed courts to terminate immediately the rights of parents who
have been convicted of certain violent crimes. The Washington
181. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2) (1998).
182. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130(2)(a)-(c) (naming preliminary findings as necessary grounds
for finding aggravated circumstance). Under the proposed change, one way a court may be able to
determine that a parent is at risk of abusing or neglecting a present child is if the parent has clearly
failed to effect significant change in his or her parenting habits during the time period between the
prior termination and the present adjudication. Failure to effect change must be determined on a case
by case basis. See supra note 95.
183. See supra Part I.
184. David Hess, House Tries to Hasten Adoption of Children, Seattle Times, May 1, 1997, at Al.
185. Id.
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Legislature subsequently revised its statute to treat prior criminal
convictions as sole grounds for termination of parental rights. Although
this change may help some children, it does not sufficiently protect the
welfare and safety of our state's young citizens.
Washington needs a statutory amendment allowing courts to treat
prior terminations of parental rights, followed by subsequent declarations
that present children are dependent as grounds for present terminations.
This proposal finds support in the fact that when a court finds a parent
unfit to care for a child and incapable of remedying his or her parenting
deficiencies, that parent may be unfit to care for other children in the
foreseeable future.'86 The proposed amendment recognizes that with
violent criminal convictions and prior terminations alike, the best way to
protect children from aggravated abuse and prevent them from becoming
victims of state processes is not family reunification, but swift
termination followed by adoption. Washington's children deserve no less
than this reasonable solution to the aggravated problem of abuse and
neglect.
186. Kassenbaum, supra note 33, at 1551; see also supra Part III.B.
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